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Although a visual illusion is often viewed as an amusing trick, for the vision scientist it is a
question that demands an answer, which leads to even more questioning. All researchers
hold their own chain of questions, the links of which depend on the very theory they
adhere to. Perceptual theories are devoted to answering questions concerning sensation
and perception, but in doing so they shape concepts such as reality and representation,
which necessarily affect the concept of illusion. Here we consider the macroscopic
aspects of such concepts in vision sciences from three classic viewpoints—Ecological,
Cognitive, Gestalt approaches—as we see this a starting point to understand in which
terms illusions can become a tool in the hand of the neuroscientist. In fact, illusions can
be effective tools in studying the brain in reference to perception and also to cognition
in a much broader sense. A theoretical debate is, however, mandatory, in particular
with regards to concepts such as veridicality and representation. Whether a perceptual
outcome is considered as veridical or illusory (and, consequently, whether a class of
phenomena should be classified as perceptual illusions or not) depends on the meaning
of such concepts.
Keywords: perceptual illusions, gestalt theory, cognitivism, ecological approach, veridicality, reality, perceptual
theories
Introduction
To survive in an ever-changing environment, animals must gather information about their
surroundings, for animals must seek nutrition, mate, find shelter, etc. To carry out its tasks an
animal must rely on information collected through its sensory systems. This must be ‘‘extracted’’
and ‘‘abstracted’’ (Gibson, 1979) from an abundance of sensory input, and ultimately understood.
Whatever one’s theoretical stance, the aforementioned operations can be considered in terms of
processes—registration of structural invariants (Gibson, 1979), information elaboration driven by
assumptions (Rock, 1983), functional organization of stimuli (Koffka, 1935), etc.—which ultimate
purpose is to generate a dynamicmodel of the surrounding environment, on the basis of which the
animal acts.
Though our sketch is quick and rudimental it should still satisfy most scientists interested
in the workings of perceptual and cognitive systems. Yet, as soon as one starts to consider
how sensory data is processed and the likes of the model generated, things become convoluted.
We here discuss how visual models of the environment are conceptualized in psychology, which
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will allow us to put into focus how illusions are conceived by
most vision scientists, and briefly discuss the role they may play
in current vision sciences. As facts, illusions are theoretically
neutral, yet the way they are described and handled in perceptual
studies is largely dependent on the theoretical frameworks of
scientists. Even a very simple classification system of visual
illusions encompasses to some minimum extent a level of
explanation (Vicario, 2011). We will not deal with such systems
here, as we are interested in visual illusions as a general concept.
Theoretical Frameworks
The term ‘‘model’’ is itself troublesome, as it can denote
two things: a replica or a representation of macro aspects
of the environment. These two meanings, as we intend
them here, are mutually exclusive. A replica means that
the model is in all ways a faithful rendering of the macro
aspects of something else. A model conceived in terms of
a representation is instead a mediated set of assumptions
or a functional scheme about aspects of the environment
(events, objects, environmental layout) that are potentially
relevant to the perceiving organism. The difference between
those conceptualizations is better understood if we consider
the term veridicality. If something is classified as veridical,
it means that it is truthful, adherent to ‘‘reality’’, thus not
illusory.
For a model conceived as a replica, the term ‘‘veridicality’’
has no special meaning: it adds nothing to the concept as the
model is already conceived in terms of an exact duplicate of
what it models. A replica is all, or else it is not a replica.
This is, in sum, the stance of the Ecological theory of visual
perception (Gibson, 1979). To the famous question posed by
Koffka (1935, p. 75) Why do things look as they do, a Gibsonian
would likely answer Because they are what they are. According
to this theoretical approach, the visual environment replicates
the macro aspects of the physical environment: we see what
is there, not more, not less. For instance, elements of the
environment directly offer information in terms of their possible
uses. There is no need to generate hypotheses to see that we
can use a concave object to collect water from a pond, if
we needed to. Gibson spoke about affordances—a concept he
modified from Lewin’s (1926) Aufforderungscharakter—in terms
of invariant properties of physical objects that specify how
they can be employed. No inferences are required: the visual
system extracts and abstracts invariants of structure from the
proximal stimulus. Veridicality has no place as a term in the
lexicon of a Gibsonian because things appear exactly as they
should.
If the model is instead conceived in terms of a representation
of the environment, then rather than a copy it is a reconstruction
of the physical environment triggered by information entering
the visual system. Conceiving the model as a representation,
however, can lead to different directions. For instance a
representation can be realistic or functional. Veridicality is
fundamental in the first case, irrelevant in the second.
Conceiving the model in terms of a veridical representation
implies that the goal of the visual system is to represent relevant
aspects of the physical environment as faithful as possible. A
veridical representation, however, is not a mere copy, it is an
interpretation of the outside world based on visual information
(cues) gathered by the system and combined with content already
stored in the brain. The processes behind the determination
of the model are generally referred to as rapid unconscious
inferences (Gregory, 1995) and in recent years have been
elegantly accounted for in terms of Bayesian inferences (Knill
et al., 1996). This is, in sum, the stance of cognitive approaches
to visual perception. The hypothesis that drives such theories
is that sensory data are largely undetermined, meaning that
sensory input is basically ambiguous in terms of what it may
refer to. Hence, the model generated by the visual system is
a representation largely dependent on unconscious inferences
driven by past experience, information integration, etc. The
result is a cogent visual environment tightly related to the
physical environment that builds on three important factors:
information density (quantitative and qualitative characteristics),
the observer’s experience (past or genetically encoded) and
expectations (contextual). For instance, the Müller-Lyer illusion
can be accounted for in terms of inappropriate constancy
scaling (Gregory, 1963): the pair of angles placed at the ends
of each line are implicit depth cues that induce the visual
system to interpret the lines as belonging to different depth
planes. Adding cues to the scene, either coherent or contrasting
with the aforementioned ones, will enhance or reduce the
illusion.
The difference between a veridical model and a replica is that
the last is directly given as copy of the outside world, whilst the
first is generated by means of assumptions and logic (Rock, 1983)
governed by a likelihood principle: the visual system constructs
the interpretation that is the most likely state of the environment
that could have caused the sensory input.
Conceiving the model in terms of a functional representation
of the surrounding environment means that the representation is
functional to the needs of the person, and whether it is veridical
or an exact replica of the environment becomes an irrelevant
issue. The model is guaranteed to work not because it replicates
the physical environment in all its macro aspects, nor because
the visual system infers through unconscious cognitive processes
the actual nature and qualities of the physical environment,
but because it is egocentric, i.e., the person is the center of
the environment. This is, in sum, the stance of traditional and
modern Gestalt approaches to visual perception. To work, the
model must assume a somewhat deterministic set of operations
on the sensory input, which the gestalt psychologists referred
to in terms of auto-organization of stimuli and postulated as
a gestalt identity between the perceptual experience and its
underlying cortical processes (isomorphism) (Metzger, 1963;
Köhler, 1971). The Gestalt and the Ecological approaches share
a common indifference towards the notion of veridicality, but
for different reasons: if for the Ecological approach such concept
is unnecessary, for the Gestalt approach it is irrelevant, given
that there is no way to establish whether a percept is veridical
with respect to the distal source of stimulation, as knowledge
of such source comes from the percept itself, or is mediated
by the use of some instrumentation, which however cannot tell
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what is more veridical. Moreover physical properties of a distal
stimulus are only rough correlates of what is perceived (Zavagno
et al., 2011a,b). For instance, the luminance of an achromatic
surface is the physical correlate of lightness (achromatic surface
color), which however, does not correlate with the luminance
of the physical surface: a sheet of paper with reflectance 70%
may appear light gray even if its luminance changes dramatically,
because lightness is a contextual experience, functional to the
characteristics of the scene in relation to the perceiver. The
same holds for other percepts: e.g., the velocity of a moving
target may appear slower or faster depending on factors such
as background figural features (Actis-Grosso, 2008; Actis-Grosso
et al., 2008).
The differences between Gestalt and Cognitive theories
are especially centered on the mechanisms involved in visual
perception. It is not just by chance that Rock (1983) entitled
his book The logic of perception, whereas Kanizsa (1980) entitled
his La grammatica del vedere (The grammar of seeing): the
term ‘‘logic’’ refers to inferential processes that share something
in common with higher cognitive processes, whilst ‘‘grammar’’
refers to a set of structural rules that are more binding.
In the first case it is the richness of information available,
both in terms of actual stimulation and of stored knowledge,
that drives the validity of the representation of the world.
In the second case it is assumed that the representation is
driven by the pattern of stimulation and the structure of the
visual system.
The three groups of theories described above are ‘‘pure’’: they
are clearly opposed one to another. Attempts have been made
to somewhat fuse them together, in particular by incorporating
‘‘what is good’’ from the Ecological and the Gestalt theories
within Cognitive approaches. Though in principle the fusion of
different perspectives enriches our understanding of phenomena
and processes, in the case of visual illusions the result is often
a theoretical pot-pourri that appears logical and capable of
answering all questions, but in fact solves no problems.
The Place of Illusions in Perceptual
Theories
If we assume that we see what is there (Ecological approach),
then illusions should have no place in our visual experience,
because by definition illusions do not exist in the physical
world. There is of course a problem: illusions are a pretty
well known category of visual phenomena. Given a problem,
there is also a solution: without entering details, the existence
of illusions is basically resolved by considering the richness of
information available in the environment. As the ecological
validity of an environment is reduced—e.g., an experimental
setup in a laboratory can be considered an environment with
relatively poor ecological validity—also the richness of the
information available is reduced. Illusions occur because the
visual information available is relatively poor. Illusions are
therefore mishaps to be found only in reduced settings and
artificial setups, not in ecologically valid environments. From
the viewpoint of the Ecological approach it is therefore almost
pointless to study visual illusions, unless these become tools
in studying the extraction and abstraction of invariants of
structure.
If we assume that our perceptual experience is a
representation of the world that tends towards veridicality
(Cognitive approaches), then illusions are errors driven by
specific sets of cues and assumptions that guide scaling processes
and scene analyses. Illusions appear not only or necessarily
because the information from the environment is quantitatively
poor but because it is basically ambiguous. The quality of
visual information is the key towards veridicality: the more
non-contrasting cues are entwined, the more accurate our
representation of the environment. As the number of entwined
cues is reduced, and the quantity of conflicting information
is eventually increased, stimulus ambiguity is also increased
along with the probability of an error by the visual system in
rendering some properties within its representation. Such errors
are, however, systematic (Gilchrist, 2006) and can therefore be
used to study the logic by which the visual system works, i.e., the
set rules employed to run inferences and combine cues.
If we assume that our perceptual experience is a functional
representation of the world, centered around us (Gestalt
approach), then illusions do not exist from a purely perceptual
stance, as we have no clue to what we should see other than
what we are actually seeing. As with the Ecological approach,
we seem to have a problem because illusions are a pretty
well known category of phenomena. The problem is however
solved by considering our actual experience of visual illusions:
we are aware of an illusion not because we see it but rather
because we know how things are, or should be, from a physical
point of view. For instance, in the Müller-Lyer illusion we
see two lines, one delimited by converging, the other by
diverging angles, and we see that those two lines are different
in length. If we measure the two lines, however, we then
find out that they are physically equal in length; nevertheless
they still appear different in length even if we know they are
physically equal (Vicario, 2005). In other words, illusions are
cognitive experiences, not purely perceptual ones: to appreciate
an illusion we must have awareness of the discrepancy between
our perceptual reality and the physical world; such awareness
drives both on perceptual and cognitive material, but it is
conflicting only at a cognitive level. This dual origin of illusions
renders them useful tools in studying both perception and
cognition.
Illusions and Visual Neuroscience
Two friends are in a car; the passenger asks the driver:
‘‘Why are we going faster?’’ ‘‘Because I pressed on the pedal’’,
answers the driver. The answer is formally correct but not
very informative. What does this have to do with illusions and
neuroscience? The answer of why things appear as they do
cannot be confined to the definition of the neural correlates of
visual phenomena: the where issue is not a sufficient answer.
In the past two decades a lot has been written about where
things happen in the brain, which is an important starting
point that however does not fully address the how and why
issues. How processes take place will become more clear when
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neuroscientists will be able to connect single cell responses
to networks of cells, and understand the communication and
integration of information across networks. It is not only a
question of mapping the brain and describing its architecture,
but it is also a matter of understanding its functional architecture
and interconnections. Neuroscience is already stepping on the
path that leads to a fruitful understanding of how the brain
processes visual information. We believe that illusions may
become relevant tools in such studies, if research is not limited
to finding where an illusion occurs in the brain, but how and why
it comes to be.
The procedure required to answer why questions, however,
cannot be disjointed from a theoretical framework, which will
also condition the experimental questions to be addressed.
For instance, Movshon and Blakemore (2000) claim that to
understand ‘‘the full richness of sensory processing, we must
appreciate both the volume of computation and the sophisticated
deductions that give rise to our sensory experience’’ (p. 251). The
approach adopted is that of a cognitive neuroscience, where the
assumption is that inferences and deductions are a core feature
in determining the model (sensory experience) generated by
the visual system. This type of approach is particularly eager
to find top-down neural phenomena, which in combination
with bottom-up information, drives the generation of the visual
model. Within this theoretical framework visual illusions can
become useful tools not only for uncovering areas of the brain
that are supposed to be responsible for systematic errors due
to wrong assumptions, inappropriate scaling, etc, but also for
studying the ongoing neural communication between different
areas of the brain while perceptual processing is taking place.
Gestalt theory has also embraced the challenges of a
new relationship with neuroscience, looking for Gestalt-like
neural mechanisms (Ehrenstein et al., 2003; Calì, 2013).
The most significant project that goes in this direction is
probably GestaltReVision directed by Johann Wagemans, with
an impressive output in terms of empirical studies connecting
psychophysics to neuroscience (Mijovi´c et al., 2014; Sassi et al.,
2014). But what role can visual illusions have in a Gestalt
approach to visual neurosciences? While a gestaltist would agree
with Rogers (2014, p. 840) that ‘‘there is no satisfactory way
of distinguishing between those aspects of our perception that
we regard as veridical and those we label as illusions’’, we
do not think that a Gestalt approach to visual neuroscience
would dismiss illusions as phenomena that ‘‘might reveal how
our perceptual systems work (or fail to work) in only rather
limited or impoverished stimulus situations’’ (p. 844, emphasis
ours). Within a Gestalt approach, illusions become ‘‘natural
laboratories’’ (Kanizsa, 1980) as their systematic nature can be
advantageously used to uncover the functional architecture of the
visual system. The goal is understanding how the visual system
produces a perfectly functional model of the world that goes
beyond the visual information available (Kanizsa, 1980).
What about the Ecological approach and its relationship
to current visual neuroscience? Although links between the
two appear to be less direct, it is a fact that current
perception-action theories resonate with at least some of
Gibson’s ideas, e.g., the role attributed by Gibson to vision
as a support for behavior, which we believe contributed
in distinguishing between vision for recognition and vision
for action (Goodale and Milner, 1992; Milner and Goodale,
2008), with strong parallels between the functioning of the
dorsal stream (visual control of motor behavior) and the
Ecological approach to visual perception (Norman, 2002). The
survival of Gibson’s legacy, however, relies especially on the
concept of affordance, a relevant perceptual attribute in the
study of perception for action and its reconciliation with a
more modern approach in terms of active vision (Findlay
and Gilchrist, 2003). In this respect, we believe that visual
illusions, though intended as mishaps within a purely Ecological
approach, may still maintain an important role in studying
perception for action (Goodale and Humphrey, 1998; Bruno
et al., 2008) also within vision neurosciences, as they may
aid in understanding the different ways in which the brain
processes spatial information based on the goals of the perceiver-
actor.
Illusions have the potential to play a relevant role in visual
and cognitive neuroscience; however how illusions are employed
ought to reflect theoretical stances in which terms such as
veridicality and representation are thoroughly defined. How the
neural mechanisms that shape perception and cognition are
described will inevitably impact on how reality is conceived.
Researchers should be aware that all models rely on metaphysical
assumptions, the cornerstones of which are the two faces of a
same coin: reality/illusion.
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